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Abstract-This paper focuses on the design of optimal procurement contracts within a 
competitive bidding environment assuming (i) the buyer and contractors are uncertain 
about the final cost, (ii) the contractors have private information about the cost and 
their attitudes toward risk and (iii) the buyer and winning contractor observe the final 
cost when the good is delivered. Examples of the optimal profit schedule and selection 
process are presented demonstrating (i) how such contracting procedures are designed 
and (ii) how the buyer’s beliefs about the contractors’ characteristics can affect the 
optimal contracting procedure. The approach suggested is a practical and viable ap- 
proach to contracting where the risks and costs of projects are great. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
General description 
Situations arise where a buyer (e.g. a firm or an individual) is interested in hiring a con- 
tractor to supply a good for which detailed specifications are provided. For example, 
consider a firm requesting bids for the construction of a (manufacturing) plant. The firm 
provides blueprints and other requirements to several contractors. The ultimate cost is 
uncertain to the contractors and buyer due to random fluctuations in labor and construction 
costs. After construction the buyer and hired contractor observe all costs incurred; per- 
mitting the payment awarded to the contractor to depend on the final cost. With cost 
being uncertain, the buyer wants the good at the lowest expected price (expected cost 
plus profit), and, if the buyer is risk-averse, he will want to minimize risks as well. 
This paper presents a theory for determining the appropriate profit arrangement to 
award. It focuses on designing an optimal profit schedule (a family of profit arrangements), 
taking into account that a contractor chooses the profit arrangement hat best suits him. 
In a competitive situation the buyer is also concerned about the decision rule that defines 
the winning contractor based on the profit arrangements chosen. The contractor’s choice 
of profit arrangement depends on his attitude toward risk and his beliefs about the final 
cost and about his competitors. The approach taken is to model the contractors’ decision- 
making processes and the bidding game among the contractors by assuming (i) the con- 
tractors maximize their expected utilities and (ii) the contractors believe competitors will 
choose their equilibrium strategies (profit arrangements). 
The amount of private information that a contractor has influences the complexity of 
the buyer’s problem. Two types of private information are considered: (i) beliefs about 
the cost of the product and (ii) risk preferences. The contractor usually has more precise 
information about the final cost, and it is very unlikely that the buyer knows a contractor’s 
attitude toward risk. Also the contractors are uncertain about each other’s risk-preferences 
and beliefs about cost. This is described as a problem of informational asymmetry. 
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By using the approach suggested in this paper, the bidding process is efticiently de- 
signed. Any information a buyer has about the competing contractors is incorporated in 
the appropriate profit schedule and decision rule. 
Past studies have not sought optimal contracting procedures. For example, Baron]11 
only analyzes the effect specific profit arrangements have on a contractor’s bidding strat- 
egy. The deduced bidding strategy is based on a partial, not a complete, analysis of the 
competitive bidding situation. Holt[2] restricts his study to profit arrangements that are 
linear in cost; however, he studies the effect that different contracting procedures have 
on the bidding equilibrium. The different procedures analyzed are the contracting versions 
of the first-price and second-price auctions. Other works are concerned with the incentives 
that specific profit arrangements have on a contractor’s efforts to control costs: e.g. 
Cummins[3] and Blanning, Kleindorfer and Sandar[4]. These works have overlooked the 
impact that such contracts have on the bidding strategies of the contractors. All of the 
above studies assume that the utility functions of all contractors are known. Brown[Sl, 
however, seeks optimal profit arrangements when there is a single source and the con- 
tractor’s risk-preferences are uncertain. This paper is an extension to the competitive 
case. 
A specific example and solution 
Consider a corporation that needs to have a computer system developed. There are 
only two contractors capable of providing the system desired. The cost of the system is 
either around 8 or 16 million dollars. The final cost is uncertain because there is uncertainty 
as to the amount of advanced technology, beyond the state-of-the-art, required. The buyer 
believes that each contractor can be one of four types, based on combinations of a con- 
tractor’s assessment of which final cost is most likely and his attitude toward risk. The 
buyer is uncertain of the contractors’ type and represents this uncertainty by a probability 
distribution. The bidding process should be designed so that each contractor is at least 
as well off as when he is guaranteed a half a million dollars. This figure represents what 
the buyer and contractors agree to be a contractor’s opportunity cost for providing the 
system. 
Under specific assumptions of what the four types are and assuming a contractor is 
equally likely to be any of the types, the optimal profit schedule and decision rule to 
announce to each contractor are the following: 
Profit received, conditioned on chosen profit arrangement and jinal cost. 
Cost (in millions) 
8 
16 
Profit arrangements (in millions) 
1 2 3 
2.757 3.911 1.583 
- 1.243 -0.144 -0.319 
Probability you win, conditioned on the profit arrangements chosen. 
Your choice 
1 
2 
3 
4 
1 
0.5 
0 
0 
0 
Competitor’s choice 
2 3 
1 1 
0.5 0 
1 0.5 
0 0 
4 
1.239 
0.214 
4 
0.5 
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Presented with this, the contractor chooses one of the four profit arrangements. His choice 
will depend on his risk preferences, beliefs about cost and beliefs about what profit ar- 
rangement his competitor will choose. The details of this case are described in Section 
2. METHODOLOGY 
Description and definitions 
This problem is formulated as a Stackelberg game-theoretic problem. The buyer of the 
product is the leader, and the contractors (the potential sellers of the product) are the 
followers. The buyer establishes the rules of the game to be followed by the contractors 
and consist of 
(i) the type of bidding information required from each contractor that will be eval- 
uated to determine the winning contractor, 
(ii) how the bidding information received influences the final profit arrangement 
awarded, and 
(iii) the method of evaluating the bidding information in order to determine the winning 
contractor. 
These rules are chosen so that the buyer’s expected utility is maximized subject to the 
condition that the contractors choose strategies that optimize their own expected utility 
given that the other competing contractors are choosing their optimal strategies. This 
condition defines the equilibrium concept used, a Bayesian-Nash equi1ibrium.t These 
rules must also guarantee that when a contractor chooses his optimal strategy he is still 
willing to enter the bidding process. 
As mentioned earlier, we assume that the buyer has imperfect information on the con- 
tractor’s beliefs about the cost of the product and risk preference. The buyer needs in- 
formation on these two aspects of all competing contractors before a decision can be made 
as to which contractor best serves the interest of the buyer. This defines the bidding 
information that is to be sent to the buyer prior to the declaration of a winner. A contractor 
has his own probability assessment of the cost of the product, and he knows his risk- 
preference. However, it is assumed that each contractor is uncertain about each of his 
competitor’s types. 
A contractor’s strategy is defined as a rule that determines the bidding information to 
be provided to the buyer depending on the information available to the contractor. This 
information might typically consist of the contractor’s attitude toward risk, probability 
assessment of the final cost of providing the product, expected profits from other projects, 
projected future contracts and knowledge of competing contractor’s business, production 
function and the like. For purposes of this analysis, it is assumed that the information 
available to a contractor, upon which it will determine its strategy, consists only of his 
risk-preference and probability assessment about cost, his beliefs about competitors’ risk- 
preference and cost, and the rules of the bidding process. 
Risk preference refers to the contractor’s attitude toward risk. This can be modeled 
by an appropriate choice of utility function defined over a monetary measure. A con- 
t A Bayesian-Nash equilibrium among n players is defined as follows. Let si*(_xi) represent a Bayesian- 
Nash equilibrium strategy as a function of player i’s type. Let si represent any other strategy. For IS’*, . . . , 
s”*} to be a set of Bayesian-Nash equilibrium strategies the expected utility of contractor i, EUi(.), must satisfy 
the following EU’(s’*, sei* ) 2 EU’(s’, S-‘*) for all si and i = 1, . . , n. (s-j* represents the strategies of all 
players except player i.) A Bayesian-Nash equilibrium differs from a Nash equilibrium in that the other players 
types are unknown, and therefore expectation is taken over their types. 
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tractor’s utility function as it depends on his type is assumed known but not the value of 
the parameters which specify his type. A contractor’s probability assessment of cost is 
modeled in a similar manner. The functional form of the contractor’s distribution on cost 
conditioned on his type is known but not the values of the parameters that define his type. 
For example, the final cost of the product is believed by the buyer and the contractor to 
be distributed exponentially, however the buyer is uncertain as to what the contractor 
believes is the value of the parameter of that distribution. 
Definition 1. Let xi represent contractor i’s type summarizing his risk-preference and 
probability assessment on the cost of the product. In the simplest situation xi is a two- 
dimensional vector, the first component represents the contractor’s risk-preference and 
the second component represents the contractor’s expected cost of the product. 
Definition 2. Let g’(x-’ 1 xi) represent contractor i’s assessed joint probability of all 
other contractors’ types, XC’, given that contractor i’s type is xi. This conditional prob- 
ability defined over all possible values of x-i represents contractor i’s imperfect infor- 
mation about his competitors’ types. 
Definition 3. Let U’(w, xi) denote contractor i’s utility function as it depends on wealth 
w and the contractor’s type. 
Definition 4. Let f(c 1 xi) represent a contractor’s assessed probability distribution 
on cost as a function of his type xi. 
Both Definitions 3 and 4 define general representations of U’ and f as functions of xi 
and include the more reasonable case that U’ and f depend on xi only through the relevant 
component of xi. 
In the sense of Harsanyi[6], it is assumed that the buyer and contractors have probability 
assessments of everyone else’s type. In order to circumscribe the problem of a continual 
regression of beliefs about competitors’ beliefs about competitors’ beliefs, etc., Harsanyi 
introduced the possibility that the conditional distributions of all contractors are consistent 
with the buyer’s joint distribution of the unknown types. (Myerson[7] and Dasgupta, 
Hammond and Maskin[8] state that this assumption is not necessary, provided the set of 
contractors’ conditional distributions is common information to all.) 
Dejkition 5. A contractor’s conditional distribution is consistent with the buyer’s 
joint distribution g(x) if g’(xx’ ( xi) = g(x)/xX-i g(x). (zX-i is the summation over all 
combinations of all contractors’ types except contractor i.) 
This assumption of consistent probability distributions is realistic if all competitors 
have access to the same information on past bids announced and final costs incurred, 
from which the joint distribution and conditional distributions are deduced. 
The expected utility of the buyer will influence how the bidding information stated by 
the sellers is to be evaluated in determining when a contract is awarded and to whom. It 
is standard practice that the evaluation procedure be a direct comparison of the quoted 
expected cost of providing the product so that the expected cost is minimized. This seems 
to be a reasonable rule, but is not always appropriate when contractors may differ in their 
willingness to share risks. By maximizing the buyer’s expected utility, taking into account 
the seller’s optimal strategies, the appropriate evaluation procedure is derived. 
Definition 6. Let d(b) represent the probability that contract i receives the contract 
as a function of all contractors’ bidding information, b = (b’, . . . , b”). This probability 
measure is referred as the buyer’s decision rule. 
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The profit schedule awarded to the winning contractor is assumed to be quite general. 
It may be to the best interest of the buyer to have it depend not only on the final cost of 
the product, in order to take advantage of risk-sharing, but also on the bidding information 
provided by all the contractors participating in the bidding process. This seems intuitive 
if the contractors’ types are believed to be correlated. 
Definition 7. Let P(c, b) represent the profit schedule awarded to the winning con- 
tractor. The final profit awarded depends on the bidding information received b and the 
ultimate cost c observed by both the buyer and contractor. 
Finally, the formulation allows for each contractor to have different reservation prices. 
These are certainty equivalents of a contractor’s opportunity elsewhere. 
Definition 8. Let P*i represent contractor i’s certainty equivalent of profit from po- 
tential contracts no longer obtainable (due to capacity constraints) upon winning the 
present contract. 
Mathematical formulation 
The mathematical formulation analyzed seeks the optimal profit schedule and decision 
rule that induces contractors to quote their true types as their Bayesian-Nash equilibrium 
strategies on the bidding information to reveal. This restriction on the nature of the induced 
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium is justified by the Revelation Principle (Myerson[71, Das- 
gupta, Hammond and Maskinl81). By limiting the search to the rules that induce truth- 
telling, the buyer is still guaranteed his highest level of expected utility, and the search 
of bidding rules is made easier. 
The mathematical formulation of the problem is stated below. The formulation assumes 
all random variables are discrete. This being the case, the problem is a nonlinear optim- 
ization problem. 
Problem. The buyer wishes to 
c - P(c, x>)f(c 1 2) -UO(0) > 1 d(x) g(x) + UO(0) 
subject to 
5 (z U'(P(c, xl, x’)f(c 1 xi) - u;(P*;, Xi)) d’(x)g’(x-’ 1 xi) 
c 
2 z, (2 WP(c, b’, x-‘), xi)f(c ) xi) - Ui(P*i, xi) d’(b’, x-‘)g’(x-’ 1 x’) 
c 
and 
c, x), x’)f(c 1 xi> - Ui(P*;, x’) d’(x)g’(x-’ 1 xi) I 0, 
foralli = 1,. . . , n and 2, b’ E T’. (T’ represents the set of all possible types contractor 
i could be. xX is a summation over all combinations of all contractors’ types.) 
The first constraint when applied for all 6’ E T’ constitutes the truth-telling constraint 
on contractor i. The second constraint when applied for all i = 1, . . . , n is the participation 
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constraint that guarantees each contractor a certainty equivalent of his reservation price, 
P*i. These constraints have been algebraically simplified by eliminating the term U’(P*‘, 
x’) from both sides of each constraint. 
Examples of optimal solutions are presented in the next section for cases where a 
contractor’s type xi consists of both his risk-preference and a cost parameter that sum- 
marizes his private information about his probability assessment of cost. The problems 
analyzed are the simplest that retain the features of the general problem and yet dem- 
onstrate how the theoretical approach suggested in this paper can be used to generate 
optimal bidding processes to be used in practice. By discretizing the costs and contractors’ 
types, the problem is treated as a nonlinear optimization problem with constraints. If the 
contractors are similar except in their types and the joint distributions on the contractors’ 
types are independently and identically distributed, the buyer’s problem is in its simplest 
form with m* constraints and km + m” variables, where m is the number of types a 
contractor can be, kis the number of possible final costs and IZ is the number of contractors. 
3. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES 
We assume there are two competing contractors, and each contractor can be one of 
four types, based on combinations of low or high risk-preference and low or high cost- 
parameter. There are only two possible final costs. This provides a simple profit schedule 
Table 1, Case A: Assumptions-Demonstrates the effect changes in the joint distribution of contractors’ 
types have on the optimal solution 
Number of Contractors: 
Both Contractors’ Reservation Prices: 
Possible Costs: 
2 
500 
cr = 8000 
cl = 16000 
Distribution on Cost (probability of c, = 1 - ~2; probability of c2 = ~2): 
Low Type High Type 
x2 = .I X2 = .9 
Expected costs: 8,800 15,200 
Risk Preferences (Exponential Utilities with risk-averse coefficient I/XI) 
For the Contractors: For the Buyer: 
Low Type High Type 
Xl = 500 x, = 1000 r = 1000 
Notation: The four types a contractor can be are 
HL High risk-preference and Low cosr-parameter 
HH High risk-preference and High cosr-parameter 
LL Low risk-preference and Low cosr-parameter 
LH Low risk-preference and High cost-parameter 
Joint Distribution on Contractors’ Types: 
Probability either contractor is of a particular type: 
Cases: Al A2 A3 A4 A5 
Probability 
t HL I/4 318 l/8 118 318 
Y HH l/4 I/8 318 318 l/8 
P LL l/4 318 l/8 318 l/8 
e LH l/4 l/8 318 l/8 318 
Contract must be awarded 
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Table 4. Case A: Contractor’s Loss by Lying 
Al A2 A3 A4 AS 
True 
Type 
HL 
HH 
Reported 
Type 
HH 
LL 
LH 
HL 
LL 
LH 
20 
0 
357 
1452 
420 
0 
Loss in Certainty Equivalent 
104 0 165 
0 
138 
58: 0 
467 
1632 1264 1473 
473 447 578 
0 0 0 
0 
0 
53 
1592 
420 
0 
LL HL 665 721 589 617 748 
HH 0 0 0 0 0 
LH 155 0 273 148 0 
LH HL 1541 1751 1328 1543 1704 
HH 17 4 26 16 5 
LL 484 585 495 659 480 
Table 5. Case A: Gains above Reservation Price 
Al A2 A3 A4 A5 
Contractor’s 
Type Gains in Certainty Equivalent 
HL 415 194 673 482 231 
HH 2 1 3 0 7 
LL 199 45 341 160 117 
LH 0 0 0 0 0 
Table 6. Case A: Lagrange Multipliers 
Al A2 A3 A4 A5 
True Reported Lagrange Multipliers Associated 
Type Type with the Equilibrium Constraints 
HL HH 
LL 
LH 
HH HL 
LL 
LH 
LL HL 
HH 
LH 
LH HL 
HH 
LL 
0 
.07 
0 
0 
0 
1.55 
0 
.06 
0 
0 
0 
.79 
0 
.13 
.02 
0 
0 
0 
.02 
.03 
0 
0 
0 
2.30 
0 
.14 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
.04 
0 
0 
0 
2.29 
0 
.19 
0 
0 
0 
0 
.Ol 
.06 
0 
0 
0 
.81 
0 
.09 
.02 
0 
0 
0 
Contractor’s 
Type 
Al A2 A3 A4 
Lagrange Multipliers Associated 
with the Participation Constraints 
A5 
HL 0 0 0 0 0 
HH 0 0 0 0 0 
LL 0 0 0 0 0 
LH 2.58 1.32 3.84 2.55 2.61 
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and yet retains the significance of having risk-sharing profit-arrangements. It is assumed 
that the contract is always awarded. 
The buyer and contractors are assumed to have exponential utilities, U’(w) = -emwir 
and u’(w, x’) = - e”“I i wherex: represents the risk preference of contractor i. A contractor 
may have a low or high risk-preference. There are two possible final costs. The cost 
parameter xi represents the probability the final cost is the higher value. This parameter 
may be also one of two values. Thus a contractor is one of four possible types. 
The results presented focus on how the optimal solution is affected by (i) changes in 
the joint distribution of the contractors types and (ii) changes in the higher value of the 
cost parameter. 
The numerical results are summarized in Tables 1-13. (The results were obtained by 
using Mines/Augmented, a nonlinear programming system developed at Stanford Uni- 
versity by the Systems Optimization Laboratory.) In all cases presented, a contractor’s 
risk-preference is either 500 or 1000. The buyer’s risk-preference is 1000. The two possible 
costs are 8000 and 16,000. The cases are divided into two groups. The first group, denoted 
A, demonstrates how the optimal solution is affected by changes in the probability dis- 
tribution of the contractors’ types. The second group, B, shows the effect changes in the 
higher value of the cost parameter have on the optimal solution. 
The assumptions for cases A and B are summarized in Tables 1 and 7. Tables 2 and 8 
list the optimal decision rules for the corresponding cases. (Logically, the buyer would 
be indifferent between the two contractors if they reported the same bidding information. 
In numerically seeking the optimal decision rule, the decision rule was fixed at 0.5 when 
the contractors could report the same information.) Since the contract is always awarded, 
Table 7. Case B: Assumptions 
Demonstrates the effect changes in the higher value of the cost-parameter have on the optimal solution 
Number of Contractors: 2 
Both Contractors’ Reservation Prices: 500 
Possible Costs: c, = 8000 
cz = 16000 
Distribution on Cost (probability of c, = 1 -x2; probability of cz = XZ): 
Low Type High Type 
x2 = .l x2 = * 
Expected costs: 8,800 * 
Cases: Bl B2 B3 B4 B5 
x2 .5 .3 .2 ,125 .l 
expected 12,000 10,400 9,600 9,000 8,800 
costs 
Risk Preferences (Exponential Utilities with risk-averse coefficient l/x’) 
For the Contractors: For the Buyer: 
Low Type High Type 
x, = 500 x, = 1000 r = 1000 
Notation: The four types a contractor can be are 
HL High risk-preference and Low cost-parameter 
HH High risk-preference and High cost-parameter 
LL Low risk-preference and Low cosr-parameter 
LH Low risk-preference and High cost-parameter 
Joint Distribution on Contractors’ Types: 
It is equally likely that a contractor is any particular type. 
Contract must be awarded. 
T
a
b
le
 8
. C
a
se
 B
: 
D
e
ci
si
o
n
 R
u
le
 - 
P
ro
b
a
b
ili
ty
 C
o
n
tr
a
ct
o
r 1
 W
in
s 
C
a
se
s 
B
l 
T
y
p
e
 
H
L 
H
H
 
LL
 
LH
 
B
2
 
H
L 
H
H
 
LL
 
LH
 
B
3
 
C
o
n
tr
a
ct
o
r 2
 
H
L 
H
H
 
LL
 
LH
 
B
4
 
B
5
 
H
L 
H
H
 
LL
 
LH
 
H
I,
 
H
H
 
LL
 
LH
 
c 0 
H
L 
.5
 
1
 
1
 
1
 
.5
 
1
 
1
 
1
 
,.
5
 
1
 
1
 
1
 
.5
 
1
 
1
 
1
 
s 
.5
 
1
 
1
 
n
 
t 
H
H
 
0
 
.5
 
0
 
1
 
0
 
s 
0
 
0
 
0
 
I_
 5
 
0
 
1
 
0
 
I-
 5
 
1
 
1
 
.5
 
.s
 
1
 
1
 
rl
 
a
 
LL
 
0
 
I 
.5
 
1
 
0
 
1
 
..
5
 
1
 
0
 
1
 
..
5
 
1
 
0
 
0
 
‘5
 
1
 
0
 
0
 
..
5
 
‘5
 
C
 
t 
LH
 
0
 
0
 
0
 
.5
 
0
 
0
 
0
 
.5
 
0
 
0
 
0
 
.5
 
0
 
0
 
0
 
.5
 
0
 
0
 
.5
 
..
5
 
0
 r 
T
a
b
le
 9
. C
a
se
 B
: 
P
ro
fi
t 
S
ch
e
d
u
le
 
C
a
se
s 
B
l 
B
2
 
B
3
 
B
4
 
B
.5
 
co
st
 
8
o
o
o
 
1
6
0
0
0
 
8
0
0
0
 
1
6
0
0
0
 
8
0
0
0
 
1
6
0
0
0
 
8
0
0
0
 
1
6
Q
O
O
 
8
0
0
0
 
1
6
0
0
0
 
H
L 
2
7
5
7
 
2
6
7
4
 
2
5
9
7
 
2
5
6
5
 
2
4
6
9
 
- 
1
2
4
3
 
- 
3
3
2
6
 
- 
1
4
0
3
 
- 
1
4
3
5
 
- 
1
5
3
1
 
c 
sk
o
p
e
 -.
5
@
 
- 
.5
0
 
-.
5
0
 
- 
so
 
- 
so
 
0
 
II 
H
N
 
3
9
1
1
 
3
3
5
4
 
2
9
.5
1
 
2
.5
8
0
 
2
4
6
9
 
tt
 
- 
1
4
4
 
-6
0
6
 
-9
1
5
 
- 
1
3
2
0
 
- 
1
5
3
1
 
rY
 
sl
o
p
e
 -
 .
4
1
 
- 
so
 
- 
.4
8
 
- 
.4
9
 
- 
so
 
a
p
 
ce
 
LL
 
1
5
8
3
 
1
4
9
1
 
1
1
4
1
 
r1
0
6
 
1
3
8
5
 
t 
-3
1
9
 
- 
5
2
3
 
-4
4
3
 
- 
4
.5
0
 
- 
5
6
8
 
0
 
sb
p
e
 
-.
2
4
 
- 
.2
5
 
- 
.2
0
 
-.
1
9
 
- 
.2
4
 
r 
LH
 
1
2
3
9
 
1
2
1
8
 
1
6
8
1
 
1
9
9
0
 
1
3
8
5
 
2
1
4
 
-1
1
 
-2
6
6
 
-5
1
7
 
- 
5
6
8
 
sl
o
p
e
 -
.1
3
 
-.
1
5
 
-.
2
4
 
- 
.3
0
 
- 
.2
4
 
Competitive procurement contracting when risk-preferences are uncertain 295 
Table 10. Case B: Contractor’s Loss by Lying 
True Reported 
Type Type 
Bl B2 B3 B4 
Loss in Certainty Equivalent 
BS 
HL HH 
LL 
LH 
HH HL 
LL 
LH 
LL HL 
HH 
LH 
LH HL 
HH 
LL 
1 
0 
290 
994 
18.5 
0 
685 
0 
96 
1334 
133 
3.51 
0 
0 
227 
621 
78 
0 
660 
17 
0 
1164 
252 
317 
0 
28 
148 
367 
0 
0 
731 
145 
0 
1040 
320 
145 
0 
87 
118 
57 
0 
19 
745 
520 
0 
842 
605 
17 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
695 
695 
0 
695 
695 
0 
Table 11. Case B: Gains above Reservation Price 
Contractor’s 
Type 
Bl B2 B3 B4 
Gains in Certainty Equivalent 
B5 
HL 347 278 212 186 104 
HH 12 20 42 77 104 
LL 137 32 29 12 0 
LH 0 0 0 0 0 
Table 12. Case B: Lagrange Multipliers 
True Reported 
Type Type 
Bl 82 B3 B4 
Lagrange Multipliers Associated 
with the Equilibrium Constraints 
B5 
HL HH 
LL 
LH 
HH HL 
LL 
LH 
LL HL 
HH 
LH 
LH HL 
HH 
LL 
0 
.06 
0 
0 
0 
.58 
0 
.I5 
0 
0 
0 
0 
.02 .04 
.03 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 .12 
.21 .Ol 
0 0 
0 0 
.08 .I6 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
.04 
0 
0 
0 
.08 
0 
0 
0 
.I2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
.03 
0 
.03 
0 
0 
0 
.07 
0 
0 
0 
Bl B2 B3 B4 B5 
Contractor’s Lagrange Multipliers Associated 
Type with the Participation Constraints 
HL 0 0 0 0 0 
HH 0 0 0 0 0 
LL 0 0 0 0 0 
LH 1.01 .46 .24 .I7 .14 
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Table 13. Case A and B: Buyer’s Certainty Equivalents 
Case A: Buyer’s Certainty Equivalent 
Conditioned on the Winning Contractor’s Type 
Al A2 A3 A4 A5 
HL 12,690 12,450 12,940 12,720 12,490 
HH 16,300 16,310 16,300 16,290 16,320 
LL 13,520 13,260 13,610 13,400 13,480 
LH 16,360 16,360 16,370 16,370 16,350 
Buyer’s Certainty Equivalent 
of the Bidding Process 
15,040 13,930 15,780 15,040 15,050 
Case B: Buyer’s Certainty Equivalent 
Conditioned on the Winning Contractor’s Type 
Bl B2 B3 B4 B5 
HL 12,610 12,520 12,450 12,420 12,320 
HH 15,180 14,230 13,540 12,710 12,320 
LL 13,400 13,200 13,270 13,260 13,150 
LH 15,520 14,790 14,130 13,430 13,150 
Buyer’s Certainty Equivalent 
of the Bidding Process 
14,160 13,510 13,160 12,760 12,600 
only the probability that contractor 1 wins is necessary to determine the probability that 
either contractor wins for a given set of bids. 
Tables 3 and 9 present the optimal profit-schedules in each case. A slope stated in 
either table represents the slope of the line joining the two possible profits that a given 
type may receive. This allows us to easily compare the solution to the Pareto-optimal 
profit arrangement hat results when the buyer knows a contractor’s risk-preference and 
cost-parameter. [Mossin[9] demonstrates that when both contracting parties have utility 
functions of the same class of HARA utility functions, the Pareto-optimal profit arrange- 
ments are linear. In particular, if both parties have exponential utilities the slope of the 
profit arrangement is -r”l(rb + vu) where rb is the risk preference (inverse of the risk- 
averse coefficient) of the buyer and r” is the risk preference for the contractor.] When 
all participants have exponential utilities, the Pareto-optimal profit arrangement has a 
slope equal to - l/2 if a contractor’s risk-preference is 1000 or has a slope equal to - l/3 
if a contractor’s risk-preference is 500. 
Tables 4 and 10 list the amounts a contractor can lose (in terms of certainty equivalent) 
if he were to deviate from his equilibrium strategy. If the loss is zero, this denotes a 
binding equilibrium constraint and the contractor is indifferent between quoting his true 
type and the corresponding lie. This equilibrium constraint is referred to as a weakly 
incentive-compatible constraint. Later in the discussion, reference is made to the “degree 
of weak incentive-compatibility.” The “degree” refers to the number of constraints that 
are weakly incentive-compatible. 
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Tables 5 and 11 summarize the gains in certainty equivalent (above the reservation 
price) that a contractor is given so that the equilibrium constraints are satisfied. 
Tables 6 and 12 present the values of the Lagrange multipliers associated with the 
equilibrium and participation constraints. The multipliers associated with the equilibrium 
constraints are analyzed to compare the marginal cost of a constraint to the buyer. 
Finally, Table 13 demonstrates how the buyer’s certainty equivalent varies from one 
case to another. 
4. OBSERVATIONS 
First, we should note how the optimal solution in cases A and B differ from the Pareto- 
optimal solution. Each contractor, except the LH type (low risk-preference and high cost- 
parameter) has a certainty equivalent for the bidding process that is above his reservation 
price. It is also the case that the LH type is the least desirable of all the types in all cases. 
This is necessary in order to guarantee that the equilibrium constraints are satisfied. In 
the Pareto-optimal solution, the contractor obtains a certainty equivalent equal to his 
reservation price regardless of his type. We also observe that the contractor with a high 
risk-preference is awarded a profit-arrangement hat has a slope very close to the slope 
of his Pareto-optimal profit-arrangement, - l/2. In fact, the contractor with a high risk- 
preference and a low cost-parameter is awarded a profit arrangement with a slope precisely 
equal to - l/2. However, the profit arrangements for the contractors with low risk-pref- 
erences have slopes that are far from the Pareto-optimal slope, - l/3. In some cases, a 
contractor with a low risk-preference and a high cost-parameter has a profit arrangement 
with a slope nearly zero, implying the contractor shares very little risk. This occurs when 
there is a low probability that the contractor is an LH type. 
From case A, we see how changes in the probability distribution of the contractors’ 
types affect the degree of weak incentive-compatibility. Of the cases considered, the 
highest degree of weak incentive-compatibility occurs when there is a negative correlation 
between risk preferences and cost parameters, case A5. In this case, there are five binding 
equilibrium constraints. The smallest number of such binding constraints (three) occurs 
when (i) the risk preference and cost parameter are positively correlated, case A4, and 
(ii) when the contractor is equally likely to be any of the four types, case Al. 
It is interesting to note that in the three cases Al, A4 and A5, the buyer’s certainty 
equivalents of the bidding process are approximately the same. However, the profit sched- 
ule varies greatly among these cases in order to counter the changes in a contractor’s 
beliefs about his competitors. Cases A2 and A3 yield significantly different certainty 
equivalents to the buyer. This is due to the increase or decrease in the probability a 
contractor has a low cost-parameter. In cases Al, A4 and A5, the probability a contractor 
has a low cost-parameter is always l/2 as compared to 314 in case A2 and l/4 in case A3. 
From case B, we find that changes in the difference between the two possible cost- 
parameters affects which equilibrium constraints are binding. For example, if the cost 
parameters are sufficiently far apart as in case B 1, a contractor of type HL is indifferent 
to saying his type is LL or HL. However, in case B4, we find that he is indifferent to 
saying his type is HH or HL. 
In many cases, the buyer’s ranking on which types should be awarded the contract 
corresponds to a ranking of the types according to their certainty equivalent of the bidding 
process. Typically, the higher the contractor’s certainty equivalent, the more preferred 
his type is to the buyer. This is true in results from Brown[ lo], where the risk preferences 
are assumed known. We find that this is not always true in this more complicated problem. 
In case B3, the contractor with type HH has a higher certainty equivalent of the bidding 
process than the contractor with a type LL. However, the buyer does not prefer the HH 
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type. Only when the two possible values of the cost parameter are either close enough 
or just far enough apart, will the rankings be completely correlated. This anomaly is due 
to the growing significance to the buyer of the contractor’s risk-preference over his cost 
parameter. The significance warrants a higher certainty equivalent to the HH type because 
of his high risk-preference; but the chance of a high cost-parameter value with the HH 
type is still large enough to consider the LL type more desirable. Therefore, the ranking 
of the contractors’ certainty equivalents does not always correspond to the buyer’s ranking 
of the preferred types. 
In case B5, the cost parameter is known by the buyer and the contractors and its value 
equals the low value of the cost parameter; i.e. x2 = 0.1. This result demonstrates that 
the limiting solution of cases Bl through B4 is not BS. This is observed by considering 
the profit arrangement for a contractor with a low risk-preference. For example, the high 
profit obtainable by an LL type is decreasing as the higher value of x2 approaches the 
lower value, 0.1. However, when x2 is 0.1 with certainty, the LL-type’s profit is higher 
than in case B3. 
5. CONCLUSION 
The examples demonstrate how the theoretical approach suggested in this paper can 
be used to generate optimal bidding processes to use in practice. A more realistic case 
would have more contractors and types of contractors. Increases in the number of con- 
tractors and types only increases the number of constraints and variables to be determined. 
The methodology is the same. For example, suppose there are n competing contractors 
and each contractor can be of m types. There are k possible final costs. In the most 
complicated case, the highest number of constraints and variables is the following: 
mm 
nm(m - 1) 
nkmn 
nmn 
participation constraints; 
equilibrium constraints; 
profit variables; 
decision variables. 
However, if we can assume that the contractors’ types are independently and identically 
distributed, and all contractors are similar except in their types, the programming problem 
simplifies considerably. In that case, we have 
m 
m(m - 1) 
km 
mn 
participation constraints; 
equilibrium constraints; 
profit variables; 
decision variables. 
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